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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Health care is currently a prevailing economic and political issue in the
United States and in many other nations. The United States and other countries
experienced a rapid growth in health care spending over the past thirty years. The
rapid growth in spending spurred interest in this sector and led to the emergence of
Health Economics as a distinct specialty within Economics. Annual expenditure on
personal medical services increased from 5% of GNP in 1965 to 12.1% of GNP in
1995 with total medical spending accounting for 13.7% of GNP in 1995
{Henderson (1999), p. 236].
The health care sector experienced substantial changes beyond changes in
spending. Private health insurance coverage has been gradually declining over the
years, and thus, the number of uninsured is steadily climbing. This fact combined
with a surge in spending and other changing characteristics in the dynamic health
care industry fostered public concerns that the system needs reform. While the
issues of healthcare reform cover a wide gamut, the universal concerns focus on
three broad categories: quality, access, and affordability.
The purpose of this paper is to assess price and quality across hospitals.
More specifically, it theoretically and empirically examines the varying level of
quality and price between hospitals with different control structures. When2
comparing for-profit with nonprofit hospitals, theory suggests nonprofit hospitals
provide a higher level of quality than do their for-profit counterparts. The premise
for this theory lies in the nonprofit hospital's zero-profit constraint. Nonprofit
hospitals are technically allowed to derive profit from their activities, typically
referred to as excess revenue, but do not have shareholders to benefit and are not
allowed to distribute this profit to managers. Excess revenue is dispersed back into
continuing and expanding operations. Theory proposes this channeling of funds
allows a financial tool to improve the level of quality for a given hospital. The
following empirical work strives to test the proposition that nonprofit hospitals
provide a higher level of quality and provide lower cost care than their for-profit
competitors.
There is a wide range of literature available for Healthcare Economics,
nonprofit institutions, and competition between firms. The purpose of this paper
narrows the scope of relevant literature primarily to those works focusing on the
quality of healthcare, nonprofit behavioral functions, and empirical studies of
hospitals as firms. When discussing the quality of healthcare, discussions divide
into two distinct areas: the general quality of the hospital (often associated with
prestige) and the quality received by patients.
A wealth of information exists addressing these topics. This paper
embraces the issue of quality in the broadest sense when discussing the theoretical
model. That is, quality reduces to a single, well-defined variable in order to
facilitate the purpose of this paper. Readers interested in a survey of the quality ofcare should see Folland's (1997) text. More important to an empirical study of
hospitals is the measuring of quality. The foundations for capturing a
representation of quality in regression work come from publications by Luft and
colleagues (1990) and Haas-Wilson (1990).
These works use interesting techniques to measure quality. Such
measurable factors as teaching status, transfer and referral patterns, medical school
affiliation, and various indexes of outcome indicate quality. These factors appear
in many modem publications relying on observations of the level of quality. The
empirical work contained within this paper borrows some of these measures and
expands upon them by introducing some new measures of quality, such as capital
expenditure per discharge.
The objective function of a nonprofit institution is not straightforward. The
nonprofit institution operates as utility-maximizer but the origins of the utility
function are not clear.Primary guidance for the objective function used herein
comes from the model proposed by James (1983) and a later extension of this
model by Netz (1998). The model proposed within this paper applies these models
to nonprofit hospitals. Previous economic work by Newhouse (1970), Pauly and
Redisch (1973), and Hirth (1999) applied extensions of these models to the hospital
industry and also helped guide the following empirical and theoretical work.
Rigorous empirical analysis of hospitals and hospital competition proves to
be difficult because of hospitals' unique multi-product nature. The empirical model
and the techniques used in this study rely on previous work that addresses the1j
issues of price, output, and competition. Barton and Sherman (1984), Lynk (1995),
Sacher and Silvia (1998), and Vita and Sacher (1999) provide foundations for the
empirical model used, as well as techniques for representing price and output.
Also, the works by Luft et al. (1986), Robinson et al. (1987), Noether (1988), and
Schiff and Weisbrod (1993) assist with the considerations of competition between
hospitals. More specifically, they address the theoretical interactions between
hospitals and the characteristics of the hospital market that become strategic
variables. The following work utilizes some of these techniques but places more of
an emphasis on the quality of care.5
2.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF HOSPITALS
The modern U.S. hospital emerged at the beginning of the20thcentury.
Most hospitals organized as nonprofit institutions with the main purpose of
providing free care to the poor. The majority of the population considered the
quality of care received at nonprofit hospitals to be quite poor. Those who were
able to pay for health care avoided nonprofit hospitals and helped to support the
emergence of the for-profit hospital.
Urbanization and the rise of the urban middle class fostered the growth of
hospitals as a whole while the increasing incomes of the urban middle class helped
to increase the number of for-profit hospitals. The movement towards for-profit
hospitals was short lived, however. Financial difficulties stemming from the Great
Depression and the government's preferential treatment to nonprofit hospitals
disadvantaged the growth of for-profit hospitals. Nonprofit became the favored
form because this type of hospital could accept tax-deductible, charitable
contributions, they received construction subsidies under the Hill-Burton Act, and
some state legislatures even made for-profit hospitals illegal [Henderson (1999),
pp. 237-241].
The continued dominance of nonprofit hospitals in the U.S. can be
explained with three common theories. First, consumers have great difficulty
evaluating the quality of medical care across hospitals and trust institutions that do
not face the profit motive [Arrow (1963)]. Second, since profit-maximizing firmswill not undertake activities where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost, for-
profit hospitals would not engage in many aspects of teaching, research, or public
health [Weisbrod (1989)]. This idea supports the government's financial favoritism
towards nonprofit hospitals. Finally, the nonprofit form allows for the most
benefits for physicians who, in turn, promote the dominance of the nonprofit
hospital [Pauly and Redisch (1973)].
Hospitals are classified according to the length of stay, size (usually
measured in number of beds), and type. Those hospitals where patient stays are
less than 30 days are classified as short stay while long stay hospitals are for those
stays greater than 30 days. The major types of hospitals include community (both
teaching and non-federal, general hospitals), mental, tuberculoses and other
respiratory disease, and other special hospitals. There are also federally controlled
hospitals.
Community hospitals are defined as short-stay hospitals, providing not only
general services but also specialized care. Over 85% of all non-federal hospitals
are classified as community hospitals. Their type of control further classifies
community hospitals. Non-profit hospitals account for 60% of US community
hospitals and control 70% of available beds. For-profit hospitals represent 13.6%
of all community hospitals and control 10.8% of all beds. The remaining
community hospitals are government owned, usually by the state, and typically
provide services in rural communities. Approximately 20% of all hospitals in the
US have an affiliation with one or more of the nation's 125 medical schools and':4
sponsor at least one residency training program. Of these, only 388 hospitals are
members of the Council of Teaching hospitals of the Association of American
Medical Colleges. They receive government subsidies to fund teaching and
research [Henderson (1999)].
The general categories of services provided by hospitals differ between the
classifications. Almost all hospitals provide primary care, which is preventive and
curative in nature. The larger, community hospitals provide secondary care in
addition to primary care. Secondary care consists of common medical and surgical
procedures. Both outpatient and inpatient procedures are available in secondary
care hospitals. Large, university affiliated hospitals and other specialized hospitals
provide tertiary care, consisting of transplants, heart procedures, etc., as well as,
primary and secondary care.
Since 1970, the nominal cost per day for inpatient days has increased from
$74 to $931 while the cost per stay increased from $605 to $6,230 [Sherman et al.
(1997)]. Hospital systems move towards controlling inpatient stays, the most
expensive episode of care. Hospitals' efforts to decrease inpatient hospital stays
accounted for the trend of falling inpatient utilization and increased outpatient
stays. As a result, outpatient facilities, such as freestanding ambulatory care
facilities, surgical centers, physical therapy centers, and diagnostic imaging centers
have gained popularity. This work focuses on short stay, general hospitals as is
discussed in section 5.2. This narrows the relevant competitors for a given
hospital.3.0 HOSPITAL PRODUCTION
The hospital industry is a difficult arena for economic analysis. Hospitals
certainly fulfill the requirements for a multi-product firm by providing a multitude
of services and products. Dissention arises, however, when beginning to define
their products and services. An aspirin is clearly an aspirin and a splint is nothing
less than a splint but when it comes to delineating the criteria for general hospital
production, a rather simple yet complex question arises. What do hospitals
produce?
Ideally, hospitals provide a better quality of health for their patients. If
someone goes to a hospital and exchanges money for a service, then they expect to
leave the hospital in better health than when they arrived. Those patients who do
not receive a better level of health must be considered as well. Assuming the
doctor did everything within the confines of her training and within her power to
help the patient, it is not typically argued that the patient received an inferior
product. So where does this leave the conclusion to defining hospital output? It is
apparent that solely measuring discharges is inadequate for capturing the purpose
and efforts of hospitals.
Measuring and weighting for quality, however, is empirically difficult.
Therefore, representing the true service of hospitals proves to be an arduous task.
Previously used techniques try to capture the overall quality in addition to the
quality received by patients. The average length of stay per patient and the ratio offully staffed beds to total beds are examples that are positively related to the
patient's perspective of quality. Fully staffed beds are those beds that have full
staffing resources available for them. While this is not true in every case, the
argument generally assumes cost cutting efforts take precedence within a hospital
and therefore, patients may lose some level of personal care [Luft et al. (1990)].
The overall quality of a hospital is often associated with the prestige of that
hospital within the community (geographical or specialty). The prestige of a
hospital depends upon the level of technology employed by the hospital, the quality
of physicians, the research successes, the amount of government grants, etc.
Measuring the level of these items may partly capture the prestige or quality of the
hospital. Section 5.2 addresses these issues in more detail and further explains the
techniques used within this paper.
The unique nature of hospitals has lead to substantial effort in capturing the
quality of care provided. The consequences of poor quality can be very severe to
the consumer. At the same time, the effort and time required to research quality is
very costly for consumers. Arrangements that are intended to reduce their search
costs include licensure and certification, the threat of malpractice suits, codes of
ethics, and quality assurance schemes that are either mandatory or voluntary
[Sherman et al. (1997)]. Methods that are founded in economic theory are used to
measure quality of care for hospitals. Their implications do impact policy issues
through reports and surveys provided by researchers but are not usually analyzed
by a majority of policy makers directly {Luft et al. (1990)].10
Due to the existence of third-party payers, many consumers do not directly
consider price for the majority of their decisions. Hospitals rely heavily on
physician referrals in order to attract patients. Physicians are typically attracted to
higher quality institutions because they are primarily concerned with the well being
of their patients. Also, when consumers do directly consider which hospital to
attend, quality is a majordeterminant.1
As mentioned previously, defining the product market is a difficult
proposition. In addition to quality, other hospital characteristics, such as location
and bed availability, become dominant factors for specific situations. For example,
if a consumer is suffering from heart failure or a severed limb, they will be
primarily interested in location and space availability while someone interested in
non life-threatening surgery will be more concerned with quality. In general,
quality is a major factor and thus, is an important measure of hospitals. The
following discussion assumes a product definition of non-specialized, inpatient
procedures.
'For a more detailed discussion about the price-elasticity of health care services and related
empirical work, please see Luft et al. (1986).11
4.0 THEORETICAL MODEL
Analysis of the hospital market must account for the differences in
operating objectives across different types of hospitals. Non-profit and for-profit
hospitals account for the majority of the market but while these types of control are
similar in services provided, they differ in their underlying objective functions.
Both types of institutions strive to maximize some form of utility. In the case of
the for-profit hospital, the decision-makers behave as profit-maximizers, which is a
specific form of a standard utility function, and the analysis proves to be rather
straightforward.
The non-profit hospital, however, is more difficult to analyze because there
is no well-defined objective function. I use a model where hospital decision-
makers strive to maximize utility subject to a zero-profit constraint [James (1983)].
The model is uniform with the goals non-profit hospitals: to provide easily
accessible healthcare and to provide a high level of quality of care [Newhouse
(1970)]. This theoretical model analyzes the differences in prices and quality
dependent upon the type of control in a situation where firms have a definable
objective function. The effect of cooperation on prices and quality is also
considered.
An important complication demands attention before continuing. It is
uncertain who the utility function represents. Economic research and theory
predominantly suggests that either hospital administrators or physicians with staff12
privileges are the main decision-makers behind the objective function. I assume
the decision-maker behind the utility function strives to further the mission of the
hospital and to some extent, his own career. I accept the idea that it is most
satisfring to manage a successful hospital but do not assume that he strives to
maximize his own financial well-being or "slack"time.2
4.1 FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL
The demand for hospital services is given by QQ(P, K), where quantity
decreases in the hospital's own price and quantity increases in its own quality.
Total costs are a function of the total number of discharges (Q) and the quality of
the hospital (K), C = C(Q, K), with standard properties: aC/aQ, aC/aK,aC2/aK2,
andC2/Q2> 0. The cost of increasing each output is increasing at an increasing
rate. Quality is partly perceived through the level of care per patient therefore, the
more discharges, the more costly it is to increase quality (C2IQK> 0).
In a non-cooperative setting, hospital decision-makers at a for-profit
hospital strive to maximize the individual hospital's profit function. That is, the
maximization problem is as follows:
(1) Max [1= PQ(P, K) - C[Q(P, K), K].
2For further discussion about the underlying decision-makers behind the utility function, please see
the works by Newhouse (1970), Pauly (1987), and Hirth (1999).13
The first order conditions with respect to price and quality are given by
(2)1TE/ôP = Q(P, K) + PQ/P - ôC/ôQ*Q/3P =0
(3)auia= PQIK - ôC/Q*3Q/K - 3C/K =0.
These equations yield the standard conditions for profit-maximizing firms:
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, with respect to both quantity and
quality. Since this type of hospital does not face a zero-profit constraint per Se,
they benefit directly from increasing profit. Entry and exit drive competitive firms'
profit to zero in the long run. For-profit firms operate in order to maximize profit
in the short run or to maximize profit given that they are able to exercise some
market power.
4.2 NONPROFIT HOSPITAL
Utility of hospital administrators in a nonprofit hospital is assumed to be a
function of number of discharges (Q) and quality of the hospital (K): U = U(Q,
K).3The following theoretical model borrows elements from the model used by
Netz (1998) in her analysis of universities. For simplicity, assume the utility
functions are identical across nonprofit hospitals, and assume the utility function
has the standard properties:
aU/aQ> 0, EU/aK> 0, 5U/ôQ <0, andU2/aK2<0. Identical to the for-profit
hospital, except for the consideration of rivals, the demand for hospital services is
given by Q'Q(P1, Pj, K1, Kj), where quantity decreases in the hospitals own price
For a primary source of nonprofit models, please see the work by James (1983).14
(P1), increases in rivals' prices(P), increases in its own quality (K1), and decreases in
its rivals' quality (K).
Total costs are a function of the total number of discharges (Q) and the
quality of the hospital (K), C = C (Q, K), with standard properties: 8C/Q, aC/aK,
aC2iaK2, and C2/QôK> 0. The cost of increasing each unit of output is
increasing at an increasing rate. Also, the more discharges, the more costly it is to
increase quality.
When hospitals make decisions independently, there is no concern about
their rivals' actions. Hospital decision-makers only account for the impact upon
their own hospital when choosing quality, quantity, and price. Because hospital
decision-makers assume their rivals will not react to their choices, they are
behaving as Nash oligopolists. Suppressing the non-choice parameters and the i
subscript for notational ease, the maximization problem for non-profit hospitals is
as follows:
(4)Max U(Q(P,K), K)
P, K
s.t.fl=O
where 11= PQ(P,K) - C(Q(P,K), K). Letting 2 be the Lagrange multiplier and L be
the Lagrangian maximand, the first-order conditions are given by:
(5)L/P = + XQ(P,K) + - xaC/aQ"aQ/aP =015
(6)L/ôK = U/ôQ*Q/K + aU/aK + ?P3QIaK - XaC/aQ*aQIaK -
=0
(7) aL/axPQ(P,K) - C(Q(P,K), K)0.
Solving (5) and (6) gives the following equilibrium conditions:
ôU/5Q*Q/P =Q(P,K) + PôQ/P -
aU/aQaQ/aK + U/ôKPQ/ôK - C/Q*Q/ôK - C/5K
or aU/aQ,ôQ/aP ôU/ôQ*QIK + ÔU/ÔK
Q(P,K) + PôQ/P - PQIK - 3CIQ*Q/K -
While not apparent at first, these equations give the familiar conditions for
utility-maximization. The numerators in the second form represent the marginal
utility received from P and K respectively, while the denominators indicate the
marginal profit with respect to P and K, consistent with the condition that marginal
utility per dollar be equal across the goods. The first form shows the condition that
the marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the ratio of prices, where prices
are measured as the effects on profits.
The comparison of how a utility-maximizing agent sets P and K relative to
the levels chosen by a profit-maximizing agent is important for continuation. The
constrained first-order condition for the price of hospital care and for the level of
quality show that the optimal level depends not only on marginal revenue and
marginal cost with respect to those variables, but that it also depends on marginal
utility. Marginal utility from quality is positive, so a utility-maximizing agent will
choose a level of quality that is above the profit-maximizinglevel.4Marginal
11K is negative when evaluated at the optimum.utility from price is negative so the price charged by a utility-maximizing agent will
be below the profit-maximizinglevel.5A utility maximizing administrator will
choose a price below its for-profit counterpart and provide a higher level of quality.
4.2.2 COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
What is the impact on this analysis if the non-profit hospitals jointly
determine their level of price and quality? If the hospitals in question are for-profit
institutions, they would jointly maximize profit akin to familiar economic
standards. With non-profits, however, utility is a function of quality and quantity.
If the decision-makers agree to decrease price, utility increases with an increase in
quantity but at the expense of depleting excess revenue.In turn, monies available
for expanding the level of quality diminish. This tightening of the zero-profit
constraint must be considered. For simplicity, assume there are two hospitals
cooperating and the hospitals maximize the sum of their utility functions.
Rewriting the maximization problem as a function of the choice variables, P and K,
the maximization problem can be written as:
(8) Max U1(Q1(P1, P, K1, Ku), K1) + U(Qj(P,P1,K, K1), K)
P. K
s.t. P1Q1(P, P, K1, I(s)-C1(Q1(P1,P,K1,K),K1)0
PQj(P, P1, K, K1) - C(Q(P, P, K, K1), K) = 0.
Since this is a joint maximization problem and the firms are identical, a single price
and quality will be chosen. The subscripts are retained, however, in deriving the
lip is positive when evaluated at the optimum17
first-order conditions so that the cross-price and cross-quality effects are clearly
identified. Thus, the first order conditions can be written as:
(9) ôL/P = + au1/aQ1*aQ1/aP + +
+ 21((Q1(P1, P, K1, K),K1) + +
P1aQ1/aP -ac/aQ1*aQIaP1 -ac/aQ1*aQ/aP) +
7((Q(P,P1,Kj, K1), K) + PjQ/aP + PjQj/aPj - -
=0
where L denotes the Langrangian maximand and ?j and Xj are the Lagrange
multipliers for the zero-profit constraint for each hospital. If the outcome is
completely symmetric, such that both hospitals charge the same price and have the
same quality, then P1= Pj,
K1 = K, and XjXj, and the first-order condition can be simplified to
(10)L/P = + + X1((Q(P1, P, K1, Kj), K1) +
P1aQ1/aP1 + P1aQ/aP -ac1/aQ1*5Q1/aP1 -aC1/aQ1*aQ1/aP) = 0.
To compare the cooperatively chosen P,
pC,to the non-cooperative outcome,
pncJ evaluate the first-order equation for
pC,equation (10), at the level From
equation(5), aU1/aQ1*aQ1I3P1 + ?1[Q(P1,K1) + P1aQ1/oP1 - aC1/aQ1*aQ/aP1]is equal
to zero at the non-cooperative price so
(11)L/ôPI== + AaQ1/aP(P1 -
= aQ1/P [aU1/aQ1 + A(P1 - aC1IQ1)].
Because demand for one hospital increases in the other's price, aQ1IP is positive,
and the sign of equation (11) depends on the term in the brackets. The term in18
brackets is positive, as shown by rewriting a hospital's first-order condition in a
non-cooperative setting, equation (5), as
(12)aU1/aQ1 + - aC/aQ1)-x1Q1/(aQ/aP1)> 0.
The inequality holds because X> 0, Q' is positive assuming an interior
solution, and aQ1/aP1 <0. Therefore, beginning at each hospital's non-cooperative
level of price, the cooperative first-order condition is positive, indicating that the
price should be increased to reach the cooperative optimum. As in the non-
cooperative setting, the price will not rise as far as the profit-maximizing price,
because the hospitals will again face a trade-off; a higher price allows the hospital
to invest in quality, but also reduces the number of patients, directly reducing
utility. Raising a rival's price, however, has a positive effect on both Q1 and the
excess revenue that hospital receives so the cooperative price will be higher than
the non-cooperative price.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to quality and simplifying
yields
(13) 3L/0K = 3U1/3Q*aQ/aK + 3U1/3Q*3Q/3K + 3U1/3K+ x1(P1aQ1/aK1 +
PaQ/aK -ac/aQ1*aQ/aK1- - 0C1/ôK1) =0.
To compare the cooperatively chosen K, Kc, to the non-cooperative outcome, Knc, [
evaluate the first-order condition for K', equation (13), at From equation (6),
+ aU/aK + X[PôQIK - C/8Q*QIK - C/K] is equal to zero at
the non-cooperative outcome so equation (13) can be rewritten as
(14)L/ôK
IK=Knc =aQ1/aK[aU/aQ +?1(P -19
The term aQj/oKj is negative because one hospital's demand will fall in response to
a rival's increase in quality. Once again, I am interested in the sign of the terms in
brackets. From equation (6), the term in brackets is rewritten as
(15) [aU/aQ1 + - aC1/aQ1)] = ?[ (oC1/aK1)/(5Q1/aK1)] - 0U1/aK1 I(aQ1/aK).
While the first term and the second term on the right-hand-side are both
positive, the sign for the entire term of interest is indeterminate. Some intuition can
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be derived from this, however. In a cooperative setting, the individual hospital's
incentive is to set the level of quality above the cooperatively chosen level. This is
similar to the Bertrand Paradox but in reverse. If one hospital deviates from the20
cartel agreement, they would be able to capture a larger market share. Increases in
quality come at a higher cost, however. Quantity will drop off as quality surpasses
some optimum, as is seen in figure 4-1. Quantity falls from Q2 to Q given
increased levels of quality. After some point, increased expenditures on quality
will result in small or negligible increases in demand. Thus, consumers will not
continuously finance the cost of quality advancements.
Given the tradeoff between quality and quantity, a hospital is forced to
operate within their quality-quantity frontier. Figure 4-2 depicts this frontier and
shows that hospital decision-makers will try to locate on the highest possible
indifference curve given the quality-quantity frontier (point A). A single hospital
FIGURE 4-2: QUANTITY - QUALITY FRONTIER
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could deviate from the previously mentioned cartel agreement by shifting their
quality-quantity frontier outwards. One way to do this is to find another source of
funding besides pricing. If, for instance, a hospital is able to gain additional
funding through grants and donations, they will be able to shift their frontier
outwards. Thus, competition may take the form of lobbying for government
funding or appealing to private donors.
Since the sign is ambiguous, the optimal cooperative level may be higher
than the non-cooperative level. If the quality of health care necessary to maximize
benefit to the community is above that level fundable by consumers and the
government, then health care may be treated like a public good. In this case,
"cooperation" may take the form ofjoint lobbying for a single community.
4.3 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Several real-world characteristics of the hospital market make this model
less than realistic. First, by clustering all prices and quantities into single
aggregates, one loses the effects different procedures and segments of the
population have on a non-profit's utility function. One of the missions of non-profit
hospitals is to provide care to those in particular need (e.g. those who cannot afford
medical care). The decision-makers may gain an increased level of utility by
providing the above-mentioned type of care. Also, many procedures and services
are considered more prestigious than others. Providing medically advanced
procedures to a select few patients may help foster a hospital's reputation and22
prestige and thus, directly affect the utility of the decision-makers as well as
indirectly increasing it by increasing the demand for the hospital [Lee (1971)1.
Along the same lines, the increased prestige may encourage new donations and
thus, increase the hospital's capacities. This is partly accounted for in the quality
variable but some of this effect is lost in the aggregation process.
Also, the characteristics of the hospital market make the issue of price a bit
more uncertain. Empirical research and intuition suggest the demand is relatively
price inelastic for hospital services, especially inpatient, high resource allocation
procedures [Pauly (1983) and Robinson et al. (1988)1. The predominance of third
party payers make patients rather insensitive to price, however, the prevalence of
low cost bidding for contracts has injected some degree of newfound price
competition into the system. If patients are rather price insensitive, then non-profit
hospitals may find it is in their best interest to exercise market power when possible
and use the high profits to further enhance the quality and reputation of the
hospital.
Because the increased prices will not substantially deter quantity, non-
profits may choose prices similar to the prices set by for-profit hospitals. In
summary, if non-profit hospitals collude among themselves, a higher price will be
witnessed than the non-collusive outcome. This excess revenue may be pumped
back into the hospital in the form of expansion and increased quality. The level at
which hospitals collude is uncertain. Since the market contains both for-profits and
nonprofits, collusion between types must be considered.23
In terms of price, a nonprofit will choose a price that maximizes utility
subject to the quantity-quality frontier as mentioned above. Since quantity enters
into the objective function, the nonprofit will not have an incentive to jointly
determine price with for-profit hospitals. In terms of quality, since quantity
decreases in rivals' level of quality, for-profits will not want to collude with
nonprofits. As a nonprofit hospital gains excess profit, it will be used to finance
further quality enhancements. Because for-profits are responsible to shareholders,
they will be unable or unwilling to match these advancements.
The existence of a large dominance of for-profits in a market may allow
non-profit hospitals to exercise additional market power. If price is high, they may
be able to set a price above nonprofit equilibrium without substantial loss of
patients. Such a situation would allow nonprofits to provide a higher level of
quality without sacrificing quantity assuming that increased profits benefit the
hospital directly. That is, that these profits are used directly to enhance the quality
characteristics of a hospital. This could also be used to support the idea of the
"medical arms race" referred to in much of modem, medical literature.5.0 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND TECHNIQUES
To identify the equilibrium price effects I use an empirical specification that
borrows elements from previous works focused on capturing the price effects of
hospitalmergers.6The estimating equation is assumed to take the following form:
(16) Pit = P('W,K, F1) + cit
where P is the price of hospital i at time t, W is a vector of demand shifters (e.g.
income), Zis a vector of input prices,is a vector of quality variables, Ft is a
vector of dummies representing differences in hospitals' objective functions (e.g.
non-profit); and8itis an error term with properties described below. This equation
for price depicts quality as being predetermined. I believe quality (K) is exogenous
by the assumption that price from previous periods (T-1 to T-n) impacts current (T)
quality but current price does not. Quality thus takes the following form:
(17)= K(P1,i, Fit) +
where P1,t-i is the lag of price, F1 is the type of control, and (Pit is a random error
term.
In the estimation, two measures of price are considered: the average net
revenue per discharge for all inpatients and the average net revenue per discharge
for those patients privately insured and those who fall into a gray area of uninsured
patients. This second group of people includes those patients who are uninsured
6For empirical work that uses similar techniques, please see the works by Barton and Sherman
(1984), Schumann et al. (1992), and Vita and Sacher (1999).25
but are not included in county indigent programs. For the remainder of this paper
the combination of these two groups will be collectively referred to as privately
insured. I use two prices to attempt to isolate those patients who pay directly or are
not covered by Medicare or MediCal. A hospital would be more able to manipulate
price with this type of consumer.
Unlike the classical linear model, the error covariance matrix of pooled data
models may be non-diagonal. In equation (14), there are 335 cross-sectional units
(hospitals) observed over 12 periods. I anticipate serial correlation to be an issue
because of the transitional nature of several of the variables and because the
adjustment process of price is not instantaneous. There may be heteroskedasticity
because the intensity of procedures undertaken varies greatly between hospitals.
There is probably greater variation in price as resource intensity increases. I use
two types of error structures to account for the pooled nature of the data. The
random error in the error components model has the following decomposition:
(18) ct=v1+et+ut,i1,2......,N;t=1,2.....,T
where the errors v, et, andare independently distributed with zero means and
positive finite variances
av2,e2, andoU2.
is the traditional error term unique to each observation, v is an error term
representing the extent to which the intercept of the ith cross-sectional unit differs
from the overall intercept, and et is an error term that represents the extent to which
the tth time period's intercept differs from the overall intercept. The Fuller-B attese
method is used to estimate this model. The variance components are estimated by26
the fitting-of-constants method, and the regression parameters are estimated with
generalized leastsquares.7
The random effects model is preferred because the data represents a small
fraction of a larger population in the context that only California's nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals are included in the regressions. Using the random effects
model, however, assumes the random errors associated with each cross-section unit
are uncorrelated with the other regressors [Kennedy (1998), p.227]. A Hausman
test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between regressors and thus, no
misspecification for the price equation. Therefore, the coefficient estimates may be
biased. For the quality regressions, however, the Hausman test fails to reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation between regressors so the equations are only
estimated using the Fuller-Battese method.
I also use the Parks method to estimate the price equation, equation (16),
which assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure with contemporaneous
correlation between crosssections.8This method specifies errors as
(19) J-tit = Pii,t-i + öit
where 61t is uncorrelated across observations andp1is a parameter that determines
the correlation properties of Jut. This model accounts for the previously discussed
correlation and adjusts for the biased coefficient estimates produced by the Fuller
method. Comparisons between the parameter estimates are made in section 5.3.
For a complete description of this technique, please see SAS Institute (1993) pp. 879-881.
This technique is described in detail in Greene (1997) p. 687.27
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
PRICE - Each calendar quarter, California-licensed hospitals file a
Financial Data Report with the Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development(OSHPD).9These data allow the calculation of quarterly
observations (for 1996-1998, inclusive) of the average net revenue received per
inpatient acute-care admission for privately insured patients and for all patients.'°
As mentioned previously, hospitals provide numerous inpatient services, some of
which may or may not be demand- or supply-side substitutes. Regardless, a single
measure of inpatient price is consistent with the "cluster" approach used to define
hospital product markets in many hospitalinvestigations.11
CONTROL VARIABLES - The unit of output used for this work is not a
homogeneous good. Patient stays vary substantially in terms of their resource
intensity. This heterogeneity must be controlled for in order to lend validity to
cross-sectional and intertemporal comparisons of "price". I attempt to add
consistency to this measure by using several methods and variables.
All of the California data used in this analysis is available for download from
www.oshpd.cahwnet.gov.
Net inpatient price was calculated by multiplying total net revenues from non-Medicare , non-
Medicaid patients by the ratio of gross inpatient revenue to gross total revenue at the hospital.
While this net figure eliminates Medicare and Medicaid patients it does include revenue from some
patients in various non-Medicaid indigent programs. This net revenue figure is then divided by
discharges to obtained the average price paid per non-Medicare, non-Medicaid acute-care inpatient.
I also adjust the number of discharges by the ratio of (total revenue - bad debt)/total revenue in order
to account for bad debt [Vita and Sacher (1999)].
For a critical overview of the "acute care inpatient" product market definition used in hospital
merger investigations, see Sacher and Silvia (1998) and Vita and Sacher (1999).28
A hospital case mix measure is included which measures resource intensity
used on average. This index is calculated in the American Hospital Directory by
weighting all diagnosis related groups (DRGs) a hospital performs by a case weight
index developed by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and taking
the average for each hospital. A further control for the output heterogeneity is the
average length of stay for all patients. The rationale for including this measure is
straightforward - each additional day of hospitalization requires the consumption of
additional labor and material resources. It is calculated by dividing total patient
days by discharges. Also, the average length of stay is a commonly accepted
measure of quality. It is typically argued to be a positive representation of quality
because of hospitals' efforts to minimize length of stay. Patients perceive an
extended length of stay as a sign of quality [Luft et al. (1990)]. The price of
discharges across different time periods, or across different hospitals, cannot be
accurately compared unless the variations in the length-of-stay enter into the
analysis.
Equilibrium hospital prices will also be affected by exogenous changes in
the factor prices. I include two variables to control for these effects. First, the
HCFA computes a wage index for all urban areas (a county or set of counties)
based on the salaries and wages of various health care workers in the relevant
locale. California is divided into 14 separate Health Care Statistical Areas (HSAs).
See Table 1 for HSA definitions and percentage of different types of hospitals.
These numbers represent the percentage of for-profit, nonprofit, and governmentTABLE 1: SHARE OF HOSPITAL TYPE IN EACH HSA AND HSA
DEFINITIONS
HSA 1 2 3 456 7
%For-profit 17 5 21 0 23 14 19
%Nonprofit 51 86 58 89 46 62 73
%Govemment 32 9 21 11 31 24 8
HSA 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
%For-profit 21 9 20 44 25 59 11
%Nonprofit 76 40 67 51 37 41 63
%Govemrnent 3 51 13 5 38 0 26
HSA Value Meaning
1 Northern California HSA
2 Golden Empire HSA
3 NorthBayllSA
4 WestBayHSA
5 East Bay HSA
6 North San Joaquin HSA
7 Santa Clara HSA
8 Mid-Coast HSA
9 Central HSA
10 Santa BarbralVentura HSA
11 Los Angeles County HSA
12 Inland Counties HSA
13 Orange County HSA
14 San Diego/Imperial HSA
HSA - Health Service Area in which the hospital is located This geographic area, consisting
of one or more contiguous counties, is designated by the US Department of Health and
Human Services for healthplanningon a regional basis as required by Public Law.30
hospitals within a Health Care Statistical Area (HSA). The HCFA wage index is
used to adjust hospital payments under the Prospective Payment System (PPS) for
Medicare. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Producer Price Index for surgical
and medical instruments and apparatus accounts for the second control variable for
factor prices. I include several other variables to control for exogenous demand-
and supply-side variation. These consist of per capita income, county population
density, share of admissions Medicare, and share of AdmissionsMediCal.'2
Lastly, I include a Herfindahl index for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in
each Health Care Statistical Area(HSA).13Including a Herfindahl index may help
isolate competitive behavior between hospitals. Depending upon the results,
collusive behavior could be inferred from parameter estimates. Decreasing prices
are typically associated with increasing competition, ceterius parabus. If hospitals
collude on price, the normal competitive forces would be corrupted.I include the
two separate indexes to further distinguish the differences between types of control.
QUALITY - I include several variables as a proxy for quality. First, I use
the ratio of staffed beds to total beds with the assumption that the higher this ratio,
the higher the level of care inpatients,receive. Staffed beds represent the number of
beds that have full staffing resources available. This argument is similar to the
above-mentioned issue of cost cutting. Patients perceive a higher ratio of staffed
12MediCal is a federally-aided, state operated and administered program which provides medical
benefits for certain low-income persons. This is California's version of the federal Medicaid
program.
13The Herfmdahl index is equal to the sum of the squares of market shares for nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. The index is calculated using total discharges (both nonprofit and for-profit) within
the HSA.31
beds as a more personable level of care and thus, higher quality. Secondly, I
include capital expenditures per discharge to capture hospitals' efforts to increase
the quality of their capital stock. Medically advanced hospitals continue to expand
and improve their medical capital. Thirdly, I include teaching status as a measure
of quality. The final measure of quality is the previously discussed average length
of stay.
DUMMY VARIABLES - Five dummy variables are used in this empirical
work to account for other differences across hospitals. A dummy for type of
control, equal to one if for-profit or zero otherwise, partly separates the difference
in objective functions. There is also a dummy for government-controlled hospitals.
This only represents government hospitals that were transitioned to for-profit or
nonprofit types of control. Table 1 shows the percentage share of for-profit and
government hospitals in each HSA.
Those hospitals affiliated with a major healthcare organization (e.g.
Columbia) also are flagged with a dummy variable. Not all hospitals have case mix
indexes available for researchers. A simple average is used in place of missing data
but a dummy variable depicts all those hospitals not providing this data. The use of
this variable should capture any systematic characteristics associated with not
providing data. Finally, a dummy variable is included that captures a hospital's
teaching status, as mentioned above.32
5.2 DATA
The data set contains 335 observations on hospitals in California over 12
time periods. The data are quarterly data spanning the beginning of 1996 to the end
of 1998, inclusive. Variable definitions and means are listed in Table 2. The mean
for type of control (TOC) shows for-profit hospitals account for 33 percent of the
observations. Also worth noting, the average total price per discharge (PRTO) is
$5723.84 and the average number is discharges (DIS_TOT) is 1885. The bulk of
the data used in this analysis comes from Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD). Input cost data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). Exogenous demand
shifters come from the Bureau of the Census while the case mix index comes from
the American Hospital Directory(AHD).'4The data are divided up into different
HSAs (Health Care Statistical Area) computed by the HCFA.
Those hospitals included in this data set fall into the category of short-stay
general hospitals with nonprofit or for-profit control structures. Specialty hospitals,
psychiatric hospitals, and long-term care hospitals are not included. If the analysis
were to focus solely on outpatient procedures, the relevant data set would need to
be greatly expanded.
5.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The estimated parameters of the empirical model are listed in Tables 3 and
4. Table 3 contains the results for all California hospitals using the Parks method.
14The American Hospital Directory is a web-based company providing comparative statistics
between most U.S. hospitals. Their web address is www.ahd.com.33
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable
name
Description Mean
DUM_AFFDummy variable=1 f affiliated with major health 0.19
plan,=0 otherwise.
DUM_GOVDummy variableI f controlled by government,= 0.01
0 otherwise.
TOC Dummy variable=1 iffor-profit hospital,=0 zf 0.33
non-profit or government controlled hospital.
POPDEN Population per square mile. 1637.03
INCPC Income per capita. 16268.35
WAGE The HCFA wage index for salaries and wages for 118.49
various health care workers.
PPI_SUR Producer Price Index for surgical and medical 129.28
instruments and apparatus.
DUM_CASEDummy variable=1 f no case mix is available for 0.23
the hospital,=0 otherwise.
CASEMIXAHD case mix index measuring the resource 1.39
intensity used, on average, by hospitals
LICBED Numberoflicensed beds (excluding beds placed in 210.19
suspense and nursery bassinets).
CAPDIS Total quarterly expenditures for additionsof 685.49
properly, plant, and equipment/total discharges
RATSBEDAverage complimentofbedsfullystaffed/licensed 0.83
beds.
PRPR Price per discharge for those privately insured. 5528.16
PRTO Price per discharge for all patients. 5723.84
DIS_MCARNumber offormally admitted patients for which 0.3
Medicare was the primary payer/total discharges
DIS_MCALNumber offormally adm itted patients for which 0.17
MediCal was the primary payer/total discharges34
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - CONTINUED
Variable Description Mean
name
DIS_TOT Total number offormally admitted patients 1885.47
discharged from the hospital, excluding nursery
discharges and including deaths.
DAY_TOTNumberofinpatient daysofcare (census days) 4.92
provided to all patients/total discharges.
HI_NON Herfindahl Index for non-profit hospitals. 0.04
Calculated quarterly for each HSA
DUM_TCHDummy variable=1 fpositive deductions from 0.02
gross revenue for teaching expenses,0 otherwise.
HIFOR Herfindahi Index for for-profit hospitals. 0.01
Calculated quarterly for each HSA35
The table includes results from separate estimations that use average net revenue
per patient for all patients and for those patientswho are privately insured as the
dependent variable. Table 4 consists of estimates of quality effects using average
length of stay, capital expenditure per discharge, and ratio of staffed beds as
dependent variables in separate regressions.
5.3.1PRICE REGRESSIONS
As mentioned previously, the parameter estimates generated by the Fuller
method are probably biased. The parameter estimates generated by the Fuller
method are listed the Appendix. The following discussion utilizes the results
produced by the Parks method as seen in Table3.Worth consideration, however,
is that the magnitude and significance of the coefficients generated by the different
methods is not drastic. The following discussion primarily focuses on the signs of
the various parameter estimates.
All of these results provide some evidence of differences in pricing
behavior and quality provision among the different types of hospitals. Across all
hospitals in California the dummy variable for type of control (Table 3, row 4) is
positive and significant for the average price for all patients as well as the price for
those patients privately insured. This indicates a significantly positive effect on
price if the hospital is a for-profit institution. This is consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model.36
TABLE 3: ESTIMATES FOR PRICE EFFECTS: PARKS METHOD
N=4020 R2 =0.43 R2 =0.22
PRICE-TOTAL PRICE-PRITE
RowVariableCoefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
1INTERCEPT 8053.85 2.81 -5161.28 -1.31
2DUM_AFF -2112.39 8.37 -1823.58 -5.89
3DUM_GOV -200.26 -1.03 -474.97 -1.82
4TOC 471.48 2.94 380.75 1.78
5POP_DEN -0.07 -1.66 0.01 0.22
6INC_PC 0.17 4.79 0.15 3.50
7WAGE 1.21 0.15 2.75 0.27
8PPI_SUR -106.29 -4.63 -10.84 -0.34
9DUM_CASE -43.21 -0.36 -81.69 -0.48
10CASEMIX 2926.23 8.76 3426.86 7.74
11CAP_DIS 0.03 3.09 0.03 1.79
12RATSBED 1759.08 10.46 1394.31 5.74
13DIS_MCAR 3638.58 12.47 4699.88 10.86
14DIS_MCAL 605.26 10.46 3730.28 8.32
15DAY TOT 344.98 29.26 239.38 12.89
16DED_TCH 7981.61 16.89 7305.10 8.97
17HI_NON 4864.25 2.41 2523.65 1.07
18HI_FOR -6965.09 -0.71 13861.42 1.14
DUM_AFF Dummy variable = 1f affiliated with major health care plan, = 0 otherwise.
DUMGOV Dummy variable = 1 f government hospital, = 0 otherwise.
TOC Dummy variable=1 ffor-proJIt hospital, =0 otherwise.
POP_DEN Population Density
INC_PC Income per capita
WAGE Wage index for medical personnel
PPI_SUR PPI for medical and surgical apparatus
DUM_CASEDummy variable=1 f hospital does not provide case mix,=0 otherwise.
CASEMIX Case mix index
CAP_DIS Capital expenditures per discharge
RATSBED Ratio of staffed beds
DIS_MCAR Ratio of Medicare discharges
DIS_MCAL Ratio of MediCal discharges
DAY_TOT Average Length of Stay
DED_TCH Dummy variable=I fpositive expenditures on teaching,=0 otherwise.
HI_NON Herfindahl index for nonprofits within a HSA
HI_FOR Herfindahi indexforfor-profits within a HSA37
The price effect is over 20 percent higher to those patients who are insured
by private companies. This could be explained by these patients' susceptibility to
price discrimination. Nonprofit hospitals may find it most rewarding to use this
group of patients as a source of additional funding for other continued and
expanded operation. As a result, the difference between for-profit and nonprofit
pricing becomes less pronounced when this group of patients are the dependent
variable. That is, nonprofits behave more as profit-maximizers when providing
health services for these patients.
Also worth noting is that those hospitals affiliated with a large health
organization have significantly negative estimates (Table 3, row 2). This may be
an interesting example of economies of scale and/or scope that is worth further
empirical study. Affiliation with a large health organization may make accessing
skilled professional services and medical facilities less expensive. These hospitals
may operate more efficiently because of the wide range of resources available to
them and the learning by doing effect inherent in an extended facility.
The other consistently statistically significant coefficients of interest for
California wide hospitals prove to be rather interesting as well. The coefficient for
the price of surgical apparatuses (Table 3, row 8) is only significant when total
price is the dependent variable and it is always negative. This goes against the
expected positive sign. Perhaps hospitals move towards less intensive techniques
in the face of rising input costs. The savings they incur are passed on to the
consumer. In the case of nonprofits, utility would increase in quantity but would38
fall in quality (assuming a certain level of surgical apparatus affects quality). As
the price of inputs increase, the quality-quantity tradeoff shifts inward and the
hospital strives to maximize utility given a new frontier.
The coefficients on the demand shifters of per capita income (Table 3,
row 6), the ratio of Medicare patients to total patients (Table 3, row 13), and the
ratio of MediCal patients to total patients (Table 3, row 14) are always positive, as
intuition predicts. The parameter estimate for the ratio of MediCal patients,
however, is over 400 percent higher for price incurred by those who are privately
insured as opposed to the price effect for total patients. As this ratio increases,
more hospital resources are being used under a structured reimbursement program,
which is typically the least profitable. Therefore, as this ratio increases, more
profits are recouped from the privately insured. Perhaps this is further evidence
that those privately insured or uninsured patients are the source of higher profits.
This is consistent with the theory of price discrimination.
The coefficient for the case mix index (Table 3, row 10) is positive and
significant supporting the notion that price will rise as more complicated and
resource intensive procedures are performed. This helps control for the
heterogeneity of output inherent in studying the health care market. There is no
evidence that those hospitals not providing case mix data have systematically
different price effects.
The Herfindahi index only proves to be significant for nonprofit hospitals
(Table 3, row 17) and a positive sign is associated with the coefficient. If a39
nonprofit hospital (or hospitals) becomes more dominant in a market, it may find it
consistent with its objectives to price as joint profit-maximizers and in turn, use this
profit to enhance quality. Raising price has several effects for a given hospital.
Raising own price has no effect because they are starting at the non-cooperative
equilibrium but increases in rivals! price has a positive effect on said hospital's
quantity and profit. This outcome on price is consistent with the predictions of the
collusive theoretical model. The destination of higher profits (assuming price
increases are undertaken to increase profit) is unclear. Data from the quality effects
regressions do not support the explanation of increased quality, as is discussed
momentarily.
Quality indicators consistently prove to have a positive effect on both
measures of price. Increasing the quality of care through increasing thecapital
expenditures per discharge (Table 3, row 11), the ratio of staffed beds (Table 4, row
12), and the average length of stay (Table 3, row 15), as well as being affiliated as a
teaching hospital (Table 3, row 16) appear to be positively correlated with price and
thus, financed by the consumer. The inclusion of Herfindahi indexes in the quality
equation sheds more light onto this discussion.
5.3.2 QUALITY REGRESSIONS
The results for the quality regressions are shown in Table 4. For average
length of stay (DAYTOT) and ratio of staffed beds (RATSBED) the parameter
estimate is significantly negative for the nonprofit Herfindahl index (Table 4, rows40
TABLE 4: ESTIMATES OF THE QUALITY EFFECTS:FULLER
METHOD
* Dependent Variable = DAYTOT R2= 0.11
Row Variable Coefficient t-value
1 INTERCEPT 3.62 12.58
2 TOC -0.3 -1.39
3 One-period lagofTotal Price 0.01 14.7
4 Two-period lagofTotal Price <0.01 1.02
5 HI_NON -15.14 -3.44
6 HI_FOR -6.31 -0.43
*Dependent Variable=CAPDIS R2 =0.10
Row Variable Coefficient t-value
7 INTERCEPT 556.9 4..5
8 TOC -367.84 -3.95
9 One-period lag of Total Price 0.01 0.39
10 Two-period lagofTotal Price 0.01 0.39
11 HI_NON 2064.85 1.18
12 HI_FOR 13273.59 1.94
*Dependent Variable=RATSBED R2 =0.09
Row Variable Coefficient t-value
13 INTERCEPT 0.71 23.45
14 TOC -0.11 -4.97
15 One-period lagofTotal Price <0.01 13.03
16 Two-period lagofTotal Price <0.01 1.82
17 HI_NON -0.86 -1.84
18 HI_FOR 0.59 0.41
TOC Dummy variable = I ffor-profit hospital, =0 otherwise.
CAP_DIS Capital expenditures per discharge
RATSBED Ratio of staffed beds
DAY TOT Average Length of Stay
HI_NON Herfindahl index for nonprofits within a HSA
HI_FOR HerfIndahi index for for-profits within a HSA41
5 and 17, respectively). While price is rising as nonprofits gain more market share,
it does not appear to increase quality, at least in terms of these measures. This is
still consistent with theory, which does not unambiguously predict higher or lower
quality with collusion. There are two effects counteracting each other. As the
rivals' quality increases, a given hospital loses quantity and in turn, indirectly
decreases utility. Utility increases directly, however, as the hospital's own quality
increases.
Two scenarios may explain the prevailing situation. First, quality
competition does indeed exist between nonprofit hospitals. Quality becomes more
strategic as nonprofits divide up market shares or nonprofits lose market share to
for-profit hospitals. In this case, quality increases as competition increases. This
suggests hospitals embrace quality more as a tool for increasing demand than
increasing prestige directly. That is, prestige is useful in attracting patients rather
than directly benefiting the decision-maker.
Secondly, quality increases as a result of higher profits but it takes other
forms. For instance, a nonprofit hospital may have previously built up their capital
stock and use high profits to finance its maintenance. This would not show up in
current capital expenditures. Also, the monies may be used to retain highly skilled
physicians or researchers. While quality does not appear to be increasing in the
examined variables, it cannot be concluded that quality per se does not increase
unless a more exhaustive accounting of quality is included in the empirical work.42
The Herfindahi index for for-profit hospitals is positive andsignificant for
capital expenditures per discharge (CAPDIS). This is seen in Table 4, row12. As
seen in Table 1, for-profit hospitalsdo not typically account for the majority of
hospitals. The maximum percentage of for-profits is59percent (HSA 13) but for
the remaining areas, for-profits never account for more than 44 percent.
First, it is paramount to understand that for-profit hospitals typically engage
in the most profitable procedures of health care. These are typicallylow-end,
common procedures. As for-profits try to capture alarger share of the market, they
must provide a wider range of services. By doing this, theywill compete against
the nonprofit hospitals more directly. In turn, they will have to spend more money
to provide these services as well as provide a competitivelevel of quality. Thus, as
for-profits gain more market share, they will provide a higher level of capital
expenditures per discharge in order to compete with nonprofit hospitals.
Finally, the dummy variable for type of control in the quality equation is
consistently significant (at the ten percent level for average length of stay) and
more importantly, is consistently negative(Table5,rows 2, 8, and 14). If a
hospital is for-profit (TOC = 1), then it provides a lower level of quality across the
board. This is the case when considering quality as represented by the three
proxies used in this empirical study. As seen above, if a hospital is nonprofit there
is a negative effect on price and, as seen here, there is a positive effect on quality.
The nonprofit form embraces quality and quantity in its objective functions and as a
result, provides relatively high quality at relatively low cost.43
6.0 CONCLUSION
Nonprofit hospitals' zero-profit constraint fetters the flow of profits outside
of the system but promotes quality advancements within the hospital. The quality
patients receive comes at a high financial cost. While the government does favor
nonprofit hospitals, subsidies and grants are not enough to finance hospitals'
optimal levels of quality. Consumers (or their insurance companies) pay a
substantial portion of the health care cost. The quality received at nonprofit
hospitals is significantly greater than at for-profit hospitals. Also, the price paid at
nonprofit hospitals is significantly lower than at for-profit hospitals. Thus, the
quality received at nonprofit hospitals is partly financed through the revenue taken
in from consumers and is also partly financed by the government or other third
parties.
Theoretically, nonprofit hospitals provide a higher level of quality and
charge a lower price than their for-profit counterparts. This theoretical prediction is
empirically supported in this work. The reason for the difference comes from the
nonprofit's zero profit constraint and the differences in objective functions. The
nonprofit firm derives satisfaction through quantity as well as quality while the for-
profit firm primarily strives to maximize profit.
The interaction between the two types of hospitals demonstrates the
dynamic nature of competition between firms. There is evidence that nonprofits
do exercise increased market power as the market becomes more concentrated with44
nonprofit hospitals. This could be because it is easier to sustain a collusive
outcome with less players. It is not clear, however, how these higher profits are
dissipated.Legally, they cannot be dispersed to managers but there is no evidence
they enhance quality. The evidence suggests a fall in quality which in turn supports
the notion of increased quality competition as markets become less concentrated.
The data supports the idea of for-profits increasing quality in order to
compete against nonprofit hospitals. Quality becomes a strategic variable for
hospitals when making decisions. The results herein support the theoretical
predictions of hospitals' level of quality and price. Type of control does directly
affect the quality of care received by consumers as well as the price for said care.
Also, the nonprofit form does not protect consumers from the exercise of market
power.45
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APPENDIX
TABLE Al: ESTIMATES FOR PRICE EFFECTS: FULLER METHOD
N=4020 R2=0.53 R20.26
PRICE-TOTAL PRICE-FRI VA TE
RowVariable Coefficient 1-value Coefficient 1-value
1INTERCEPT 8453.53 4.6 -309.43 -0.09
2DUM_AFF -2255.02 -8.43 -1705.35 -5.18
3DUM_GOV 45.47 0.22 -237.68 -0.62
4TOC 422.63 3.13 213.91 1.01
5POP_DEN -0.02 -0.39 0.02 0.37
6INC_PC 0.1 2.59 0.08 1.66
7WAGE -4.27 -0.62 11.97 -1.15
8PPI_SUR -78.05 -5.06 14.8 -0.54
9DUM_CASE -84.08 -0.82 144.64 0.8
10CASEMIX 1387.67 5.42 2155.28 4.94
11CAP_DIS 0.04 3.04 0.05 2.08
12RATSBED 1698.48 11.75 1327.85 5.13
13DIS_MCAR 3954.66 14.66 4609.63 9.59
14DIS_MCAL -1139.34 -3.87 3226.92 6.34
15DAY_TOT 414.9 31.26 349.56 14.46
16DED_TCH 8235.87 15.25 7289.65 9.06
17HI_NON 3018.51 1.62 2291.85 0.72
18HI_FOR -10211.6 -1.06 11658.65 0.75
DUM_AFF Dummy variable=i! affiliated with major health care plan,=0 otherwise.
DUM_GOV Dummy variable=1 f government hospital,=0 otherwise.
TOC Dummy variable1 ffor-profit hospital,0 otherwise.
POP_DEN Population Density
INC_PC Income per capita
WAGE Wage index for medical personnel
PPI_SUR PPIfor medical and surgical apparatus
DUM_CASE Dummy variable=I f hospital does not provide case mix,=0 otherwise.
CASEMIX Case mix index
CAP_DIS Capital expenditures per discharge
RATSBED Ratio of staffed beds
DIS_MCAR Ratio of Medicare discharges
DIS_MCAL Ratio of MediCal discharges
DAY_TOT Average Length of Stay
DED_TCH Dummy variable=1 f positive expenditures on teaching,0 otherwise.
HI_NON Herfindahi index for nonprofits within a HSA
HI_FOR Herfindahi indexforfor-projIts within a HSA